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and impartial moral theory, I will argue, will
acknowledge pleasure (or sentience) as the primary
inlrlnsic value; but will also acknowledge a formal
and independently based value-aspect of our world
(of which value-aspect rationality is an instance),
Such a complete theory would grant a higher status
to rational humans, but it would still condemn our
present treatment of non-human animals.

•••
Plato. Aristotle, and Kanl offer examples of
moral theories in which rationalfty plays a cenlral
value-role. For Plato this value-role is mainly
instrumental. Reason is that faculty which grasps
Quality in thlngs--their measure, proportion.
harmony, beauty.! Reason endows a being with value
because reason can lead one to the highest level of
reality--the realm of the Forms, For Aristotle.
rational activity--with its distinctive objects. its
attendant pleasures. the ties of affection it enables-is itself lhe purest. most self-sufficient mosl divine
and ennobling of activities. 2
In Plato's and
Aristotle's eyes. to lack rationality is to be an
impoverished, more limited. and less valuable being.

Biased phi losophical theorizing about moral
matters is doubly reproachable. After all. both
genuine philosophy mll!. genuine morality aim at
unprejudiced viewpoints. Surely their union should
produce no less. This. however. has hardly been the
case; witness moral philosophy's historical
accommodation with, if not outright support of.
wrongful practices like slavery, lhe subjection of
women, and the slaughter of animals for human
wants. In this paper I will explore the underlying
value assumptions which have contributed to this
hislorical record, The two value assumptions which
have been the most pervasive and innuential in
lraditional morallheory are rationalty and pleasure.
Exclusive rei iance on either of these two basic
values leads, I wll1 argue. to an inadequate moral
theory. Rationality-based moral theories tend to
innate unjustlftably the value of (some) humans at
the expense of the value of other sentient beings.
Pleasure-based moral theories, on the other hand,
tend lo be impartial. but not complete, A complete
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Those who lack some degree or more of the rational
aspect, like non-human animals, natural slaves (and
women, for Aristotle), must subordinate their ends
to those of the fully rational humans.
Kant, and other fellow deontologists. also hold
that what endows humans with value demanding of
respect (dignity) is rationality. Rationality enables
them to make free choices, to be autonomous centers
of action. and thus to be not only different from. but
superior to, lesser animals. It is this freedom which
Kant asks us to respect when he exhorts us to act in
such a way that one's principle of action admits of
universalization, and thus of (hypothetical) approval
by the recipients of one's action. If others would
(upon rational consideration) approve of my principle
of action. then in effect their wishes, will. freedom,
are not being violated by my act. Since freedom, for
Kant, derives from reason, a proper action is one
which respects another's reason.
A. Donagan
expresses this point when he states:

enjoyed become. on this view, worthless. 'will say
more on this later.
If If If

In addition to pleasure and ratjonality, are there
other plausible contenders for the role of ultimate,
non-reducible values? The following come to mind:
love (of others, of creation, of the Divine); the
highest objects of love (the Forms, the One, the
Brahman. the Judeo-Christian God .. ,); the soul or
Alman; existence itself, in any form. Since this
issue is not central to my present task. my
comments on these other candidates for intrinsic
value will be brief--perhaps too brief.
love has often been sung by poets, prophets. and
philosophers as the highest object of praise.
However. what tends to be the case in their
celebrations of love is a focus on the higher and
purer forms of love (cf. Paul's famous
characterization in Corinthians I, chapters 13-14).
No one eulogizes love of cruelly, bestiality. or even
common heterosexual love. Perhaps it is improper
to characterize the feelings directed at such objects
as love. Perhaps love surfaces only in connection
with higher objects and with things of beauty (outer
or inner). But if one's feeling for cruelty is intense
and persistent enough, why not call it love? Should
love not be identified phenomenologically and
behaviorally (and not through its correlative
objects)? If objects characteristicllily pleasant can
give one pain (e.g., Beethoven's Ninth Symphony
becomes painful to hear for Alex in Clockwork
Orange), why cannot objects normally hateful evoke
love? I propose that they can, and that to say
otherwise is to beg the question. If so, love itself
cannot be intrinsically valuable since some instances
of love are objectionable.
However, perhaps traditional praise of love is
directed at the feeling per se, independently of its
objects.
What is sought is perhaps an enriched
intensity of feeling and life. If so, love may be
advanced as intrinsically valuable. But then the
position becomes a form of hedonism. love as
feeling would accrue intrinsic value insofar as the
feeling is desirable.
The hedonist can easily
acknowledge the 'higher' forms of love, namely,

Since treating a human being. in virtue of
its rationality, as an end in itself, is the
same as respecting it as a rational
creature, Kant's formula of the fundamental
principle may be reinstated in a form more
like the scriptural commandment that is its
original; Act always so that you respect
every human being, yourself Qr another, as
being a rational crealure. 3
The major philosophical alternative to rationality
as the central value in a moral theory is pleasure
(broadly construed to encompass all positive sentient
states of consciousness). Bentham and Mill are
among those who have considered pleasure as the
only intrinsic value.
To be sure, Mll1 tries to
differentiate between lower- and higher-quality
pleasures, with intellectual pleasures placed at the
top of the quality scale. Given this addition, Mill can
claim that rationality and autonomy are of particular
instrumental value. because among other things they
enable one to experience the highest pleasures in life.
However, should all feeling be removed from the
universe.
rationality
and
autonomy
would
presumably be stripped of all value. Freedoms,
books, and paintings that cannot be experienced and

Between the Species

42

Spring 1990

Monl Theories, Imp.rtl.lity, .nd the Sbtus of Non-R8t1on.l, Sentient Beings

satisfactions after all
do have
ordinary
counterparts. The artist who finally captures an
elusive intelligible form (a "significant form" for
Clive Bell) on canvas or through some other medium,
experiences an intense satisfaction. An intellectual
who finally sorts out, clarifies, and sets in order the
threads of some particularly difficult and convoluted
subject matter, also feels a distinctive satisfaction,
Being able to carry out these expressive, ordering
feats at higher levels must surely carry with it
hIgher degrees of satIsfaction.
Whether the
experiential (hence instrumental) aspect is all there
is to the value of Quality, order, beauty, form, the
Forms, is a rich and complex Question. I will say
more on it later.
Christian tradition attributes intrinsic value to
the soul, shared by all humans and making them equal
In the eyes of God. Non-tluman animals. in contrast,
either lack a soul or possess a lower and morlal type
of soul. Thus in Christianity there is no Question of
the resurrection and eternal life of non-human
animals.
The soul has been viewed as that
immaterial substance in us In which perception.
sensation, thought, judgment. and will are centered.
The key problem with attempts to derive Intrinsic
value from souls is that such attempts merely tend
to postpone the problem of Value without solving It.
Thus, one wf1l want to know what makes the human
soul particularly valuable. Is It Its being a soul? Is
it its being a !lllIIlan soul? Is its having certain
species-neutral attributes?
If the answer is that being a soul makes us
valuable. we should want an explanation of this
claim. WlW. Is It that makes souls valuable? One
answer would appeal to the ~ of souls (and of
human souls in particular). This would lead to
cognition, rationality. and free will as the valueendowing attributes. since the powers of sensation
and perception are shared by the other, less
valuable, animals. But at this point we are back to
Aristotle and Kant.
A second option would be to say that there Is
something divine and indefinable about souls from
which value derives. However, to say that X Is
valuable because there is something valuable in X is
to make no explanatory progress. I see no other
options. so I conclude that the notion of soul does not

those whfch have the further merit of promoting the
happiness of others,
What about the highest objects of love: Divine
Objects or Divinities--do these have intrinsic
worth? Again. only a few comments will be possible
on this complex matter. First, some see 'divine' as
Implying perfection and ultimate value. Plato and
Aristotle are amongst these; and supporters of many
religions also fall in this group. Others, inclUding
some interpreters of Christianity and of other major
religions, prefer to distinguish between benevolent
and malevolent divinities, For these latter theorists,
divinity itself is not a mark of value, What makes
some Gods valuable, then, turns out to be some other
Quality like benevolence. If 50, the valued Quality
may admit of some utilitarian-hedonistic analysis.
Those who find the divine realm as exclUding
imperfection and evil. are more difficult to deal
with. This is particularly the case when mystical
and 'negative' theologies are involved.
QJite
possibly the mystics have had access to a realm of
perfection and of sui generjs value. But if this realm
and its value Is Indeed sui generjs. and
incomprehensible for us non-mystics, then the best
we can do Is plead Ignorance and leave this option
open. Often. however, those who Identify the divine
with perfection view the divine realm as including
perfected versions of human traits:
thought,
consciousness. will. pleasure, power,
If the
ordinary value of these traits can ultimately be
attributed to the pleasures and satisfactions they
provide (both intrinsically and instrumentally), then.
again, It can be maintained that what makes the
existence of divinities (or of our souls raised to
divine levels) inherently and consequentially
valuable Is the pleasure-satlsfactlon they experience
and enable the world to share In (to whatever
degree), Something similar can be said If human
powers derive their value from rationality. The
Platonic Forms, for instance, as the ultimate rational
objects. are made to order for a value-theory based
on ratlonaltty.
Might the hedonist say that· the Forms' value
derives from the activity of the minds (human or
divine) which grasp and comprehend them?
In
comprehending them, perhaps minds experience their
highest and most perfect satisfactions.
Such
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add any new intrinsic values to the ones thus far
surmised.
On the Neo-Platonlc and Augustinian view that all
existence is good. i.e .• endowed with intrinsic value,
I will make only one comment. The only way this
view has plausibility is on some panpsychlstic view
of matter. otherwise, I fail to see how one justifies
attributing any degree of intrinsic value to every
speck of matter. If one does Interpret the view
panpsychistically. then one leaves the door open for
some hedonistic analysis of the value attrIbuted to
every existent.

about animals he says the following:
Animals are not self-conscious and are
there merely as a means to an end. That
end is man ...Our duties to animals are
merely indirect duties to mankind. ...If a
man shoots his dog because the animal Is no
longer capable or servIce. he does not fail in
his duty to the dog. for the dog cannot
judge. but his action is inhuman and damages
in himself that humanity which it is his duty
to show towards mankind. o
Beings whose existence depends, not on our
will, but on nature. have nonetheless, if
they are non-ratlonal only a relative value
and are consequently called thlngs. 7

If If It

I conclude, albeit tentatively. that rationality
(broadly construed to include the power and activity
of thought. of refiectlve autonomous cholce-maklng.
of intellectual abstract comprehension. of artistic
expression), and pleasure (broadly construed to
Include the satisfying. such as one feels upon
carrying out and completing an intellectual or
artistic exercise) emerge as the only candidates for
intrinsic value. Can either alone be sufficlent 8S the
centerpiece of a complete and Impartial moral
theory? I believe not, though for dIfferent reasons.
Consider first ratlonallty-based theories.
Clearly If rationality were the
value worth
upholding. and If the power of abstract thInking
(Involving items like numbers. and principles) were
required ror rationally, then clearly some humans
and all non-human animals would lack intrInsic value.
Surely. thIs consequent Is false. Perhaps no actual
rationaltty-based theory is thIs pure and exclusive.
Thus, the target or this point may not be any major
historical theory.
Yet Aristotle, Kant. and perhaps others. have
come perilously close to advancIng thIs extreme
rationality-based view.
Aristotle. after all.
justified slavery on the grounds that some humans
are less than rational. He argued on similar grounds
for a subordinate role for women and chl1dren. 4 And.
clearly, a case can be made that on Aristotle's view
non-human animals have no Intrinsic worth.
Kant, too, on at least one occasion attributes a
lower value-status to women. since he finds them
incapable or acting from (rational) prlnciples. s And

A. Donagan. while not addressing the issue or animals
directly, says the follOWing about other less-thanrational creatures:
The insane. who cannot wholly take care of
themselves. must be looked after; and. if it
Is necessary for their well-being. may be
constrained to do various things they would
.not do If they had their own way. The
Question of how far a man's Insanity gives
right of coercion Is a dimcult one.... The
general principle. however. is clear: since
a madman Is a rational creature whose
reason is impaired, he is enlltled to the
respect due to a normal rational creature
except to the extent that the Impairment of
his reason makes It necessary to prevent
harming himself or others .... 8

m
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Clearly, the Implication is that non-human animals.
Insofar as they are not rational creatures. are not
deserving of respect. Note also the insistence on
calling the insane "rational creatures" despite their
often permanent lack of rationality. This is a case of
a Kanllan unwilling to accept the implications of
Kantianism.
It is. of course. possible to take Aristotelian or
Kantian outlooks without unduly depriving various
creatures of intrinsic value. This can certainly be
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some cases recommend the sacrifice, in secret. of a
healthy innocent person, If his/her organs can be
used to save a number of other persons of similar
age and potential. Since this is surely morally
repulsive (ft violates the individual's ~), HU in
recommending this course of action. proves Itself
InadeQuate. In short, It is unequipped to capture and
explain the immeasurable value of the Individual
(human) as recognized by our considered moral
judgments.
I grant that here there Is a conflict between HU
and our "considered" moral judgments. 12 When a
similar conflict arose between our judgments and
rationalty-based morality, we declared the latter as
InadeQuate. Should we not do the same here, and
declare HU Inadequate? Note. however, that In the
case of our considered attribution of intrinsic value
to non-rational animals. we did find a rational basis
for this, namely, sentience. Can we find a similar
rational basis for our common attribution of
immeasurable value to individuals (humans,
particularly)? If not. perhaps we should, rationally.
abandon this pre-theoretical moral judgment.
Is there something, then. about each indiVidual
human. other than sentience, which endows It with
immeasurable Intrinsic value? If value does not
derive from the contents of the receptable, it must
lie In the receptacle itself. This is, after all, what is
implied by the anti-utllilarians when they maintain
that HU misplaces value in locating It among the
contents of the receptacIe. But how can the bare
human receptacle/Individual/particular be endowed
with special intrinsic value? If by "Individual" one
means "bearer of properties" (or, similarly, "that
which survives property-changes", or "that which
Individuates each member of a set of perfect
clones"), then rocks would be. or would Include,
Individuals. Yet. rocks are surely not sacred.
Perhaps "individual", as used In moral contexts,
means "bearer of sentience" , or "bearer of human
sentience", or even "bearer of rational sentience."
Then, what we would want to know Is in what sense
Is the Individuality correlated with (human. rational)
sentience superior to the individualtty correlated
with nonsentient properties? If it Is not sentience,
or rationality, or humanity. which supplies value,
what can it be? How can the sheer individuality of

done by admitting other intrinsic values in addition to
rationality, but subordinate to it. In such a case,
however. the theory would not be a pure ratlonalltybased theory. I will, in fact, argue for such a mixed
theory later .
One can also moderate a rationality-based outlook
by treating ratlonal1ty as subject to degree. Even
so, however, those (would-be) sentient creatures
devoid of ~ ratfonal1ty would stili end up being
intrinsically valueless. Such an outcome would be
unacceptable. For. whatever the rational powers of
a being, Its feeling pleasure would be objectively
preferable to its feeling pain (everything else being
equal). Moreover, in addition to this philosophical
objection. one must not forget the historical point
that Aristotelian and Kantlan outlooks have tended to
Inflate the value-gap between some/most humans
and "lower" sentient beings. It Is no accident that It
was not Kant. but MlII who broke with tradition and
argued not only for the equal status of women, but
also for the recognition of the intrinsic value of
animals. 9

•••

)

Consider now the opposite kind of moral theory-one which derives ~ value from pleasant slates of
consciousness. Let us call this theory Hedonistic
Utilitarianism (HU).lO
HU has been commonly attacked on the grounds
that it is at odds with our. deeply held moral
judgments concerning the value of Individuals
(particularly b!JID.an individuals). From the viewpoint
of common morality, while HU is capable of endowing
non-humans with Intrinsic value, It necessarily
underestlmates the value of Individual humans. This
underestlmatlon Is due to the fact that HU conceives
the individual as a value-neutral receptacle--a mere
bearer of pleasant and unpleasant experiences ,II
These latter experiences alone are treated as
intrinsically valuable or dtsvatuable. Consequently,
on HU. the aim of moratlty becomes the maximization
of pleasant experiences, impersonally considered,
This view, opponents claim, is flawed because it
falls to take into accouot--hence falls to protect-the value, rights, sacredness, of the individual
(human). For example, it is alleged that HU must in
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as T, Nagel argues. our viewpoint on the world is not
confined to the impersonal. impartial. objective
perspective. We also face the world from a
subjective, personal. partial perspective. Thus. if I
am a doctor who ~ secretly kill A (say A is an
innocent old man who would die in a matter of months
anyway. but who refuses my pleas for voluntary
self-sacrifice) In order to save four promising young
people. who would otherwise die. I might not ~
to bring myself to Kill A in a personal face-to-face
manner. no matter what the benefits.''! But If I were
simply told that depending on which button I press,
either one or four Innocent Martians will die
presently on Mars (pressing IlQ. button means the
four will die), I might find It less difficult to save the
four by killing the one, In the latter case I am able to
adopt a more impersonal viewpoint than I could in the
former case.
At any rate. this possible explanation for my
unwillingness to harm Innocents In order to produce a
greater net good. does not rationally justify this
unwlllfngness and repugnance .15 Thus the latter
attitudes are not clear detectors of immorality.
Consequently, they do not constitute a rational
objection to HU. '6

the bearer of human properties do this?13
At thIs point, one tempting option is to say that
though we know. by Intuition. that the human
Individual is endowed with a source of immeasurable
value, we cannot explain what thIs is.
This is obviously a blind alley. Do we intuitively
recognize this X-value source only In some/all
humans? Or also in other animals? In trees and
flowers? In rocks? How do we know that this
intuitive grasp is anything other than a speclespreserving bias resulttng from evolutIonary
pressures, and preserved through unclear thinking?
I suggest that these questtons cannot be answered
satisfactorily,
A second option is to appeal to the soul as the
value-generattng aspect (other than senttence). But.
as we have seen. to appeal to this notion is merely to
postpone facing the problem. Are souls an exclusive
possession of humans? Of human and some/all other
animals? Of plants also? What differentiates soulpresence from soul-absence? Is it life? It Is
sentience? Is it rationality? What endows a soul
with value? Is it life. senttence. rationality. or
something else? In short, the notion of soul is a
promisory note which needs to be cashed out. As
soon as it is cashed out. It turns into famIliar
candIdates of IntrInsic value.
A third optton is Kant's option: value accrues in
individuals insofar as they possess reason, But this
option has already proven itself hard to digest.
Moreover, is rationality endowed with Intrinsic
value? A case can be made that its entire value Is
Instrumental. I will return to this issue later.
For the present I conclude that though. as the
critics observe. HU Is unable to capture and explain
at least one central jUdgment of common considered
morality. this Is Insufficient to prove the Inadequacy
of HU. What this clash appears to Imply instead. is
that deontologlcal views of rights and absolute
prohibitions. resting as they do on the absolute value
of the IndivIdual human, mIght have to be abandoned.
And this paves the way for the permIssibility of
harming innocents as a means to bring about some
impersonally greater net good. I admit that this Is
trOUbling and repugnant. but I cannot justtfy my
repugnance,
Perhaps
we find this repugnant Is because.

It It It

It might be pointed out to us that while we are
appalled at the idea of using some humans as means
to some greater common good, we are not similarly
struck by the massive use of other highly sentient
species for mn: purposes. That is. such massive
abuse is perpetrated on grounds even ~ acceptable
than utilitarian grounds. At the very least a
utilitarian outlook would reQuire taKing Into account
all sentient creatures. Our use of animals is
generally directed at human good only.
Naturally, this point would be ad hominum. An
impartial
deontologist
could
defend
the
deontologlcally-based rights of individual humans,
and ~ simultaneously extend rights-attribution to
other sentient creatures. This is done, for example.
by Tom Regan In The Case for Animal Rights, His
attribution of rights Is based on "the sUbject-of-alife criterion."

m
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exoerience5) tenable? I believe not.
It is clear that Regan operates according to a
substance-attribute metaphysics, He does not want
to derive value from the attributive-pole, for this
would lead to an impersonal ethics. Thus. he is left
with the substance-pole as the source of intrinsic
value. However. as we have already seen, in the
most general sense of "substance" / "individual"
--namely, as "bearer of properties," etc.--no
substance/individual can be. mla. substance/individua. any more or less valuable than any other,
Clearly. then, It must be in some other narrower
sense of "substance" / "Individual" that Regan
believes special value accrues to some individuals.
This other. narrower, sense of "Individual" is what
can be called "self" (or "subJeet-of-a-life"), But
what differentiates selves-individuals from nonselves-individuals?
I suggest that only some
attribute, or set of attributes. can do so. Given the
substance-attribute assumption, there is no other
choice,
And. in fact. as we have seen, Regan makes use
of a definite set of traits to explain what endows any
X with the status of self, This set of traits includes
consciousness, feeling, desires. belief, perception.
self-consciousness, memory, having a sense of the
future, having a psychological IdentIty over time.
and having the ability to initiate goal4ilrected action,
For Regan, being a self is. having these traits. It Is
not some additional aspect emerging from the union
of these traits.
Thus, Regan's distinction between "inherent" and
"Intrinsic" value is really an attribute-based
distinction; it is not a distinction having individuals
on one side and attributes on the other. "Inherent"
value is simply a kind of "Intrinsic" value. The
latter derives from the attribute of sentience
(feeling. consciousness, desire. etc,); the former
derives from a combination of attributes: sentience
plus
cognition-rationality-autonomy
(beliefs,
desires. perception. memory. having a sense of the
future. having a psychologIcal Identity over time.
initiating goal4iirected action), Thus, Regan does not
really transcend the traditional rationality/sentience
dichotomy, His contribution is the claim that
combining sentience and rationality yields a value
which is higher than. and which differs in kind from,

To be a sUbject-of-a-life" ,involves more
than merely being alive and more than
merely being conscious. To be the subjectof-a-Iife is to be an individual whose life is
characterized by ... [having] beliefs and
desires; perception, memory. and a sense
of the future, including their own future; an
emotional life together with feelings of
pleasure and pain; preference and welfareinterests; the ability to initiate action in
pursuit of their desires and goals; a
psychological identity over time; and an
individual welfare in the sense that their
experiential life fares well or III for them,
logically independently of their utility for
others and logically independently of their
being the object of anyone's Interests,
Those who satisfy the sUbject-of-a-life
criterion themselves have a distinctive kind
of value--inherent value--and are not to be
viewed or treated as mere receptacles fof
intrinsic value (which Regan attributes to
pleasant experiences)].17
Regan holds that to have "inherent value" is a
sufficient condition for having rights. Moreover,
"Inherent value" is of a kind Incommensurate with
intrinsic value (i.e" value based on pleasant
experiences), And since many non-human animals
according to Regan do satisfy the above
requirements, they will have such "inherent value.'
Thus. many non-human anImals should also be
recognized as having non-utilitarian rights. Witness.
then. a species-neutral kind of deontological view.
The soundness of this view rests, however, on
the plausiblllty of placing a special kind of value-"inherent value" --on. roughly, being a self (a
"subject-of-a-life"), The claim is that this kind of
value is Independent of the intrinsic value of some
types of experiences. It is the kind of irreducible
and non-instrumental value which endows one, as an
individual or receptacle, with one's own distinctive
worth. It is what makes some individuals sacred,
and what precludes their use as means only.
But is the distinction between havIng "inherent"
value (i.e.. value as an individual and having
"intrinsic" value (j ,e" value derived from conscious

Spring 1990

47

Between the Species

Moral Theories. Impartiality. and the Status of Non-Ilatlonal. Sentient Beings

What has been shown thus far? (1) We have seen
that HU does violate some important Drlma facie
moral judgments; (2) these judgments. however. are
based on the attribution of a special kind of value to
(human) Individuals; (3) attributions of this special
kind of value have been found to be suspect; (4)
therefore. HU' s violation of these prima facie moral
Judgments do not prove the Inadequacy of HU.
Before HU can be embraced. however, we must
consider an important datum noted by Regan, Kant,
Plato. Aristotle.... md. by J.S. Mill. The datum Is
rationallty's capacity to enhance the value of mere
sentience. That this Is so Is shown by the fact that If
there were a soma-pll1 which would guarantee us a
future consistlng of a succession of pleasant.
conscious states--but a succession lacking form.
unity. self-control--mostlall of us would recoil
from taking the pill. We would prefer to be
"subjects-of-a-life." autonomous agents. rational
beings. even at the cost of a good deal of hardship
and suffering, Does this datum reinstate the higher
value of most humans? And how does HU account for
it?

that of sentience alone,
The assumption behind this last claim is, I take it,
that a disconnected sequence of states of
consciousness (even when such states are singly of
intrinsic value) does not carry as much, or the same
kind of. value as does a stream of consciousness
which is internally unlfled, self-cognizant, goaldirected. The latter features can be seen as the
'form' for which sentient states are the 'matter.'
To have both is to be a self (in Regan's or Kant's
sense) --as opposed to being a "Humean" mind. Only
once one is a self does one, for Regan, acquire
spectal value as an Individual.
The thesis that a broad form of rationality
enhances the value of sentience (perhaps because It
enables enriched forms of experience) has some
plausibility. Even HU may accept It. It can thus be
argued that a being who has both sentience and
rationality Is of higher value than one who has only
sentience (we will come back to this). However.
from this it does not follow that the Increased value
is immeasurable; or that it is incommensurate with
"Intrinsic" value. Once one sees the attribute-type
basis of l22.th values. such extravagant claims lose
their initial attractiveness.
If It did follow that "inherent" value Is uniquely
immeasurable, it could be used to do exactly the
opposite of what Regan wants it to do. It could be
used to defend a Kantian type of speclesism. For it Is
highly unlikely that non-human animals possess the
cognitive-rational powers necessary for traits like
the genuine possession of "a sense of the future." or
of self-consciousness, or of "a psychological
identity over time." Each of these traits requires
the ability to abstract from the here-now; and this in
turn requires being equipped with conceptuallingUistic powers (Kant's "categories" and "Forms
of Intuition" ) which are beyond the reach of mostlall
non-human animals. 18
Thus, Regan's ploy--hls
Intrinsic/inherent dlstinction--eveo If granted.
would fail to establish value and rights parity
between humans and other spectes of animals, If
granted, It would not exempt the latter from belng
legitimately used by humans as means only.

* .. ..
This datum can be explained in two ways. Either
rationality Is an intrinsically valuable element, or it
is an instrument useful In generating richer forms of
pleasure/satisfaction. The lalter option is chosen by
Mill. The others have chosen the former option.
What counts for Mill are the richer. higherquality. pleasures "of the Intellect. of the feelings
and Imagination. and of the moral sentiments." 19
These pleasures render the possession of rationality
a particularly valuable asset. Being of higher
Quality. they outweigh much larger quantities or
lower pleasures, Proof of this Is our refusal to take
the hypothesized soma-pills,
Naturally. this latter refusal does not prove that
the higher value of the rational-sentient life derives
from higher-Quality pleasures. Opponents would
maintain that this value derives from rationality.
autonomy. and from a connected sense of dignity.
How does one decide whence the value derives?
Consider a small-scale version of this problem,
Consider the intellectual activity of solving a math
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pJea5ure with value--namely, the primitive
experiential fact that we like to feel pleasure, We
like to feel some pleasures more than others. Those
who know both prefer Intellectual-artistic pleasures
to the (often) more tntense pleasure of the nesh.
Thus. the former are of higher Quality. Such higher
Quality has, therefore, a hedonistic foundation. That
Is the end ofthe story for Mill.
But is preferring X to y the same as liking to feel
X more than Y? Is there anything we like to feel
more than food, drink, and sex? Admittedly, If
forced to choose. those who have also experienced
intellectual-artistic pleasures might I2r.U a life
containing
the latter pleasures to a life
containing
the more Intense pleasures of the
nesh. But Is thts simply due to our liking some
feelings mn than others? Might not our preference
be based on other factors?
Naturally, such other factors may be simply the
greater safety, stability, self-sufficiency of the
intellectual-artistic pleasures. But these are not
ennobling faetors--they are merely prudential ones,
That is. I suspect, why Mill himself rejected the use
of these factors In explaining the higher Quality of
some pleasures.
Clearly Nl1l, too, like Plato. Aristotle, and Kant,
wants to capture that special quality which endows
some human activities with (the potential for)
dignity and nobility. But It Is not clear that he
succeeds In this through purely hedonistic terms.

problem (or arriving at a brilliant chess move, or
finding the right words to complete a poem or to
summarize an argument).
These activities are
surely attended by a distinctive feeling of
satisfaction or even elation, We would not trade
these rational activities for activities (or passive
states) accompanied by more "primitive" pleasures.
Is that because of the rational nature of the former,
or because of the distinctive pleasures attending
them? Aristotle in his famous discussion of this in
his Nlcomachean Ethics, Book X, opted for the
former, In so doing he relegated the role of pleasure
to that of "completing" the activity. But the
obvious Question Aristotle must face is whether such
rational activities would stili be of value If stripped
of the pleasures attending them, One would think not.
After all, computers can perform these activities
without such activities thereby accruing any
intrinsic value.
Perhaps this is so only because computers are
mechanical rational agents, and not autonomous
rational agents.
Hence their activities, albeit
rational, Jack value.
However. even after adding this element of
autonomy to computers, so that their behavior
becomes both rational and unpredictable and
whatever else is needed to make it autonomous, I
would imagine that the resulting super-eomputer and
its activities would still not have intrinsic value,
Yn.Im conscious sentience were to be added, Would
this non-sentient autonomous computer be
susceptible to harm and benefit? Again, one would
think not, though It could be damaged. If this Is so,
Kant's ground for respect--the autonomy/rationality
of a being--Is undercut. HU seems to have won the
day.
But, somehow, there is something unappealing tn
the view that my life is preferable to that of a happy
pig simply because it makes possible higher-Quality
pleasures. Is our sense of dignity and self-esteem
not based on something else? And is the ~
Quality of our pleasures/satisfactions not based on
some non-hedonistic value (like autonomy)?
The latter has been a traditional objection to
Ml1l's version of utilitarianism, N11I's position Is
that what endows some pleasures with higher value
than others Is the same factor that endows m¥.
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As an alternative, I suggest that our world has
certain objective, non-experiential features which
somehow have Independent worth. Such features
seem to have an irreducibly formal aspect. The
orderliness, symmetry. organizatlon, ...in such
disparate things as butternles, ,sunsets, numbers,
natural cycles, musical patterns, ...Allit human
rationality, have long been viewed by thinkers and
poets as endowed. with a special significance O.e.,
beauty?) not derived from the experience of
subjects. No one more than Plato appreciated this
formal. aesthetic, Qualitative aspect of our world.
Following the Pythagoreans, he tended to explain this
aspect In terms of the harmony of parts. Physical
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beauty. moral goodne5s. social justice. cosmic
grace, for Plato, derived their attractive quality
from the harmonious arrangement and operation of
constituents. Reason he saw as that faculty which
seeks, identifies. and appreciates proper form. or
beauty.
In some sense. rationality (broadly
construed) is both a mirror to the beauty of the
world. and an example of this formal aspect of
order. Thus. we see reason's natural disposition
towards well-rounded creations. As an example of
this pervasive aspect of harmony. symmetry. form.
reason loo shares in the peculiar value of this
universal aspect. It is this aspect which eludes (nonhuman) animal consciousness.
But how can form. symmetry. have 1ntrlnsic
value? Would a world of beautiful things with no
conscious subjects to experience them be any more
valuable than a thoroughly ugly world? I would think
not.
Yet. it is as if the value of a beautiful but
sUbjectless world were there in potential, dormant
form. as if hidden by darkness. Then the light of
consciousness comes. and ils value is unveiled.
discovered. but not created.
Some might object that the symmetry of colors.
shades. numbers, words ...--the beauty we detect-derives Its value from our specific perceptualpsychological make-up. A rational being with the
perceptual apparatus of a bat would fail to detect the
'beauty' of a piece of music.
Yet the pattern of notes underlying the music, for
example. could be appreciated visually and
mathematically (e.g., by translating it into some
clever color pattern. or graph pattern. or numerical
pattern). Thus, we might reply that beauty has a
dimension which transcends anyone perceptual
mode. though not necessarily IDl perceptual modes.
Beauty is built on a foundation of symmetry and
regularity which can be abstracted from a specific
medium. Such a foundation has a rational make-up,
and that explains why rationality can detect it.
It may well be that rationality has no intrinsic
value--since it needs to be triggered into valueBut once
status by sentient consciousness.
triggered. it adds lo the world a value independent of
pleasure. This appears paradoxical. But is it any
more paradoxical than saying that a seed, in
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containing the genetic blueprint of a tree, in a sense
is already a tree. though it needs the matter to fi"
out the genetic form? Indeed the tree would not
exist without the matter; but a tree is no mere chunk
of matter. Likewise, the blueprint contained in the
seed of rationality ~ an essential element to the
matter of sentience.
This solution. if tenable. would explain why
thinkers from Plato to the present have viewed
rationality as the source of the greatest (or of all)
value. It would also explain Mill's version of a
utilitarianism which tends to overnow its hedonistic
boundaries. And it may. finally, explain our higher
status when compared with non-rational sentient
creatures. This higher value does not. however. put
us on some infinitely higher pedestal. Hence. it does
not justify using non-rational creatures as means to
satisfy our wants. for they, if sentient. have
Intrinsic worth as well (on a par with mentally
disabled humans). Perhaps in extreme survival
situations. where we must choose between eIther
some of us or some non-rational sentient beings. it
might be justified to destroy some of the latter
(painlessly, if possible). But this is not, generally
speaking, our sItuation today. There are plenty of
other options available in dealing with problems of
resources. of animal growth-containmenl, etc.
Thus. our present treatment of millions of sentient
creatures remains unjustifiable.
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For example. rules which allow for ulilltymaximizing exceptlons would have to be preferred to
rules that do not.
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